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1.  INTRODUCTION
Like most European nations, the Czech Republic  is in the midst of a demographic
transformation  that will have a severe  impact on the performance  of its pension system,
which  is  primarily  a public  defined  benefit  (DB)  system  financed  on  a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG)  basis. The extent of future demographic  pressures  can be clearly  appreciated  by
the projected  path of the old age dependency ratio (the ratio of the elderly population to
the  working-age  population).  The  dependency  ratio  is  currently  30  percent,  but  is
projected to increase to 50 percent by 2025 and to more than 80 percent by 2050.  Given
the extraordinary magnitude of this pressure, pension reform will be unavoidable.
During the  1  990s, the Czech Government took several steps to address the serious
demographic  challenge  that  looms  ahead.  The  PAYG  system  was  subject  to  various
reforms in that decade,  including the  gradual increase  in the retirement age for men and
women,  changes  in  the  benefit  formula,  more  restrictive  eligibility  rules,  and  other
parametric  reforms.  A  voluntary  private  pension  system based  on individual  accounts
was  introduced  in  1994,  and  participation  in this  system has  been  encouraged  by the
provision  of  a  State  contribution  to  individual  accounts.  At  the  end  of  2000,
approximately  2.3  million  workers  were  enrolled  in  the  supplementary  system,  or the
equivalent of 50 percent of the labor force.
Despite  these  positive  steps,  the  Czech  pension  system  remains  unequipped  to
cope with the strong demographic  pressures projected for this century.  The public PAYG
system  is  projected  to  run  increasing  deficits  in  the  next  decades.  Under  baseline
demographic  assumptions,  and in the absence  of further and deeper reforms,  the PAYG
deficits  will reach  8  percent  of GDP  by 2050  as  pension expenditures  soar.  Reducing
these large actuarial imbalances will inevitably involve a reduction in benefits, given that
contribution  rates  are  already  excessive  at  26  percent  of wages,  and  should  not  be
increased further. 2
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2  Pension expenditures  will rise by more than 7 percent of GDP by 2050.  These constitute a  rapid increase
in pension expenditures  and extremely  large actuarial imbalances by any international  standard.  By way ofThe voluntary  private  system could  in principle maintain the  level  of retirement
income at reasonable  levels, but the performance of the private system has fallen short of
expectations.  Despite the apparently high coverage of the labor force, participation  in the
system is strongly tilted toward old workers,  and the majority of workers under 40 years
of age remain uncovered.  This is a matter of concern,  as these are precisely the workers
that  are  likely  to  suffer  the  strongest  reduction  in  benefits.  Moreover,  the  average
contributions  to the private  system remain  very  small at  less than  3  percent  of wages,
costs have been relatively high, and the returns have been disappointing,  leading to a very
slow  growth  of total  assets-after  seven  years  of operation  assets  remain  at  around  2
percent of GDP.  Finally, pension funds have not been transparent in their operations,  due
to several  legal and regulatory  deficiencies.  These weaknesses  have raised doubts  as to
whether  the  voluntary  private  system  will  be  able  to  play  a  meaningful  role  in  the
provision of retirement income.
The  Czech system is in need of more fundamental  reform,  involving not only the
public  PAYG  system,  but  also  the private  funded  system.  The  reforms  to the PAYG
should  aim  at reducing  the large  actuarial  imbalances  and possibly  strengthen  the  link
between contributions and benefits, which has become tenuous due to a strong element of
redistribution  in the benefit  formula.  The  reforms to  the private  system should aim  at
improving coverage of younger workers,  increasing average contributions,  and enhancing
the transparency  and performance  of private  pension  funds.  In examining  the various
reform options, Czech policy-makers  will also inevitably have to address the question of
whether a fraction of the contributions  to the public PAYG system should be diverted to
the private  system,  in order to  improve the  overall  risk diversification  properties  of the
pension  system,  and  ensure  an  adequate  level  of retirement  income,  especially  for
younger workers.
The purpose of this paper is to review the structure and performance of the Czech
pension  system  and  examine  alternative  reform  options.  The  paper  is  structured  as
follows.  The second section reviews the structure and performance  of the PAYG system
and assesses how the system will evolve in the absence of fundamental reform.  The third
section examines the main PAYG reform options,  including a parametric DB reform and
the introduction of a system of notional defined contributions (NDC).  The fourth section
reviews the structure  and recent performance of the voluntary private funded system and
examines the options to increase  coverage and improve its performance.  The fifth section
assesses  the  limitations  of a reform  strategy  restricted  to  the  voluntary  pillar and  the
impact  of a  more  comprehensive  multi-pillar  reform,  including  reforms  to  the  public
PAYG scheme  combined with the introduction of a modest but mandatory  funded pillar.
The  sixth  and  final  section  summarizes  the  analysis  and  provides  some  concluding
thoughts.
comparison,  future pension  expenditures  in the European  Union are projected  to rise on average  by around
3 percent of GDP in  the same period (Oksanen 2001).
22.  THE STRUCTURE  AND PERFORMANCE  OF THE CZECH PUBLIC PAYG SYSTEM
Financial  Performance in Recent Years
The Czech  public PAYG  system has 4.7 million insured persons  covering  nearly
all the labor force,  and 2.5 million pensioners.  The scheme  provides old-age,  disability,
and  survivors'  benefits,  with  old  age  pensions  accounting  for roughly  three  fourths  of
total pension expenditures.  As shown in Table 1, the financial performance  of the PAYG
scheme weakened  steadily throughout the  1990s,  with the PAYG balance  shifting  from
surpluses to deficits of 1 percent of GDP by the end of the decade.  The shift into deficits
occurred  despite  contribution  rates  of 26  percent  of gross  wages-very  high  rates  by
international standards.3
Table  1: Financial Balance of the Public PAYG System,  19942000
(in %  of GDP
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Revenues  8.3  8.2  8.1  8.4  8.3  8.4  8.6
Expenditures  7.1  7.5  7.8  8.8  9.0  9.4  9.5
Balance  1.2  0.7  0.3  -0.5  -0.7  -1.0  -0.9
Source: Czech Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (CMOLSA).
The  financial  deterioration  of the PAYG  was  due to a rapid  increase  in pension
expenditures,  rather than  a decline  in pension  revenues.  As  shown  in  Table  2,  the tax
base  (the  covered  wage  bill)  remained  relatively  stable  at  around  32  percent  of GDP
during the  decade,  leading  to an equally  stable flow of revenues  to the  PAYG.  Wage
growth compensated  the decline in the number of insured due to increased unemployment
and  some  modest  evasion  (Figure  1).4  This is  in  contrast  with  most  other  transition
economies,  which  experienced  a severe  erosion  of their tax bases  and pension revenues
during the same period.5
Table 2: Fundamental Determinants of PAYG Revenues and Expenditures Relative to GDP
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Contribution  Rate (% of Gross Wages)  27.2  27.2  26.0  26.0  26.0  26.0  26.0
Covered Wage Bill (% of GDP)  30.4  30.3  31.1  32.2  32.0  32.5  32.9
System Dependency Ratio (%)  47.6  49.1  48.2  50.7  51.7  54.4  55.7
Replacement Ratio  (%  of Gross Wages)  44.4  43.8  43.5  45.3  45.9  45.2  44.3
Replacement Ratio (% of Net Wages)  57.2  56.6  56.0  58.3  59.0  58.2  57.2
Sources: Czech Central Statistical Office (CCSO), CMOLSA
3 Total social  security contributions  (including unemployment  and sickness  benefits)  amount to 34 percent
of gross wages,  of which 8 percent is paid by employees.  These rates are significantly  higher than average
payroll taxes of high-income  OECD countries.
4From  1994 through 2000,  the number of insured  declined  by  13.5  percent.  During the same period,  the
ratio of insured as percent of the labor force fell from 100 percent to 90 percent.
5 For  example,  the tax base  in Hungary  declined  from  33  to  23  percent of GDP during the  1990s.  See
Palacios and Rocha (1998) and Rocha and Vittas (2001).
3The increase  in  pension expenditures  relative  to  GDP  was primarily  due to  the
increase in the system dependency ratio, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 1.  The increase
in the dependency  ratio was  in turn  due  to adverse  demographic  trends,  combined with
low penalties for early retirement and a modest fall in the labor force. The decrease in the
number of insured may also reflect some evasion.  The average replacement  rate (defined
as average old pension to economy-wide  average  wage)  of beneficiaries remained  fairly
stable,  at  around 44  percent  of the  gross average  wage,  as  Figure  1 illustrates.  More
cautious pension  indexation  rules  could have  partly  offset the impact  of the worsening
dependency  ratio,  but pension  adjustmnents remained relatively  generous-very  close  to
wage indexation.6
Figure 1: Replacement  Rates and System  Dependency  Ratio (1994-2000)
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Continuous but Partial  Reform Efforts during  the 1990s
In the course of the 1990s, the Czech Republic undertook several steps to improve
the PAYG  scheme.  Early in the decade,  privileges  to  special  occupations  started to be
abolished.  In  1995,  the  Czech  Parliament  approved  a  new  Pension  Insurance  Code,
which sought to contain expenditures  due to the rising dependency ratio.  The  1995  Law
introduced,  inter alia, a  gradual  increase  in  the  retirement  age  for  men  and  women,
longer  contribution  periods for calculating pensions,  changes  in the benefit formula  and
in the  indexation regime, and restricted criteria to determine  disability.  The reform also
eliminated  remaining  privileges  for  special  occupations,  which  makes  the  Czech
Republic  one of the first transition  economies to abolish these costly provisions.  While
the  1995 Law constituted  a step in the right direction, political  compromises prevented  a
6  Pensions were adjusted  by an  average of CPI growth plus 87 percent of real wage growth in 1993-2000.
During the same period most European countries had already shifted to price indexation.
4stronger  package.  Further amendments  were  passed  in  1997,  inter  alia reducing  the
wage base assessment  for non-contributory  periods recognized for students and revising
the  indexation  rule.  In  2001,  penalties  on early  retirement  (up to  3 years  before  the
statutory retirement age  level) were increased becoming closer to actuarially fair levels to
contain the growing number of early retirees.
Although  the  PAYG  scheme  has undergone  continuous  reforms  during  the  last
decade,  these  gradual  and partial  parametric  changes  have  not been  able to restore  the
financial  viability of the  system.  Deficits  have continued  to widen,  and  large  actuarial
imbalances  remain,  as  explained  in more  detail  below.  Moreover,  the  changes  in the
benefit  formula  introduced  in  the  1990s  did  little  to  strengthen  the  link  between
contributions  and benefits, raising the possibility of an erosion of the tax base due to an
increasing unwillingness  to pay the high contribution rate.  The deficiencies  of the Czech
PAYG  scheme  after  the  partial  1990  reforns  are  better  appreciated  through  a  basic
description of the current PAYG rules and a projection  of the system in  the absence  of
further and deeper reforms.
The Current  PA YG Scheme
The  1995  Law mandates a gradual increase in retirement ages until they reach 62
for men and  57-61  for women (depending on the number of children)  in 2007  from the
original level of 60 for men and 53-57 for women.  At present, the levels are  61 for men
and  55-59  for  women.  Moreover,  the  combination  of  generous  early  retirement
provisions  and  difficult  economic  conditions  (in  particular  during  1997-1999)  led to  a
high percentage of early retirement.  More than  50 percent of new benefit claims in 1999
corresponded  to early retirement pensions.  The tightening of early retirement provisions
and  increase  in  the  retirement  age  were  steps  in  the  right  direction,  but  the  final
retirement age will  still lie below that of most OECD countries  (where the 65 minimum
retirement  age prevails)  and that of other Central  European  economies,  such as  Poland
and Hungary,  following its recent reforms.'
The  1995  Law  also  introduced  a number of changes  in the benefit  formula.  A
positive change was the increase in the number of years for computing the pension base,
from the last  10 years  to the last 30 years by 2015.  This amendment represents  a move
towards the computation of lifetime earnings,  which has been adopted  by most countries,
and  which  tends  by  itself to  tighten  the  link  between  past  contributions  and  future
benefits.  These  provisions,  however,  will  not  be  fully  effective  given  the  highly
redistributive benefit formula, which contains a flat benefit of 1310 Czech Crowns (CZK)
and "bend-points" that are triggered at relatively low levels of  wages.8
7  In  Hungary,  the retirement  age for  both men and  women will reach  62  after  its  final  state  in 2009.  In
Poland, the retirement age is 60 and 65 for women and.  men, respectively.
8 The total benefit  is equal to two  components,  a flat benefit  and a variable  benefit depending  on the past
earnings  history.  The second component of the benefit  formula is calculated as follows:
Assessment Base * Service Factor
Service  Factor = 1.5%  * total service years
Assessment Base = 100%  * (segment  1) + 30%  * (segment 2) + I0%* (segment 3)
Segment  1= wage income below 6300 crowns
5Table 3  illustrates the high degree of redistribution  implied by the current benefit
formula.  Workers  with  a  40-year  contribution  history  who  earn  50  percent  of the
economy-wide  average  wage  obtain  a  pension  equal  to  77  percent  of their  personal
wages, while workers  who earn 200 percent of the economy-wide  average wage receive a
pension equal  to 27  percent  of their personal  wages.  The replacement  ratios measured
against the economy-wide average gross wage are very compressed around the 48 percent
average.
Table 3: Old-age  Replacement Rates and Redistributive Pattern
Personal Wage/Average  Wage  Pension/Personal Wage  Pension /Average Wage
50%  77%  39%
100%  48%  48%
150%  34%  51%
200%  27%  54%
Source:  CMOLSA and World Bank estimates.
Despite the  1995  changes  and  subsequent  amendments  in  1997,  the  mechanism
for indexing  pensions  remains  complex and subject to a significant  element of political
discretion.  Pensions must be adjusted  whenever the rise in CPI surpasses  5 percent,  and
the adjustment must be at least 70 percent of the CPI increase plus one third of real wage
growth.  In  practice,  pensions  in  recent  years  (1993-2000)  have  increased  at  a  rate
equivalent  to CPI  inflation plus  87 percent  of real  wage  growth.  This historical  pattern
will be used  as an ad hoc rule for projecting  future pension expenditures  and the PAYG
balances.
Finally,  the  1995  Law  introduced  stricter  disability  rules  and  eliminated
remaining  occupational  privileges,  but failed  to tighten  the  rules  in  other areas,  such  as
the rules on non-contributory periods (i.e.,  periods during which premiums are not made,
but which  are  counted  as  service  years).  Non-contributory  periods  remain  significant
compared  to  other  countries,  including  the  periods  of  compulsory  military  service,
registered unemployment (up to 3.5 years), maternity leave (up to 4 years per child), care
of family  dependents  (partially  disabled  and those over  80),  short-term  sickness and  the
period  spent on high  level  education  (up  to  6  years  from  age  18).  These  liberal  non-
contributory rules imply a significant burden on the finances of the PAYG.  Although the
self-employed  are  subject  to  the  same  contribution  rate  (26  percent),  the  taxable
assessment  base  is  only  35  percent  of  net  income  (revenues  minus  expenditures),
significantly  lower  than  the  average  wage.  This policy  results  in a  redistribution  from
workers to the self-employed.
Segment 2=wage income between 6300 and  14200 crowns
Segment 3=wage income above  14200  crowns
These  bend points  are revalued  whenever  pensions are indexed.  On  January 2002,  the  bend points  where
increased  to 7100  and 16800 crowns, respectively.
6The Future of the PA YG Scheme in the Absence of Reforms
As  other  countries  in  the  region,  the  Czech  Republic  will  experience  rapid
population  aging  over the next few  decades  due to low fertility  rates  and increased  life
expectancy.  Baseline demographic  projections indicate that the old age dependency  ratio
(i.e.,  the population  over 60 years  to the population within the  18 to  59 year range) will
increase  from  30 to  45 percent within the next  15  years  and will  surpass  80  percent by
2050 as Figure 2 illustrates.9 This will generate a dramatic  rise in the system dependency
ratio from 56 percent in 2000 to more than  115 percent in 2050.10
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Source:  Department  of  Demography  and  Geodemography  of Charles  University  and
World Bank estimates.
The  negative  demographic  trends  projected  for  the  next  decades  will .put  an
enormous  strain  on the  PAYG  scheme.  The  actuarial  model  developed  for  the Czech
pension system,  described  in Annex I, projects that expenditures will jump by more than
Qne percent of GDP to nearly  11  percent by 2015  and rise at even faster pace thereafter,
reaching  a peak of 17.1  percent  in 2050.  At the  same  time, revenues  are projected  to
remain  stable,  due  to  a  stable  labor  share  and  a  stable  tax  base  (i.e.,  no  significant
compliance  problems).  As  a  consequence,  the  deficit  is  projected  to  widen  to  an
unsustainable  2.3  percent  of GDP  by  2015  and  to  continue  increasing  to  staggering
levels, surpassing  8 percent in 2050 (Figure 3)."  To balance the system, the contribution
rate would need to jump from the current rate of 26 percent to 53 percent in 2050 (Figure
9  These demographic projections have been elaborated  by Tomas Kucera, of the department of demography
and geodemography of Charles University in Prague, and have been incorporated into the actuarial model.
10 The dependency ratio is projected to improve slightly thereafter, due to a moderate increase in the
fertility rate projected for the next decades.
"  Annex  II summarizes  the  assumptions  for  key  economic  and  demographic  variables  used  in  the
projections,  while  Annex  III  presents a sensitivity  analysis of the PAYG  long-term  deficit under different
demographic  assumptions.
74).  Workers  would have to give up one more  quarter of their earnings to finance  these
burdensome  pension  costs.  The  distortions  in  the  labor  market  implied  by  these
contribution  rates  and the  likelihood  of severe  tax  evasion  would  tend  to  increase  the
PAYG deficit further.
Figure 3:  Financial  Performance  of the PAYG with no  Reforms,
2000-2070
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Source:  World Bank estimates.
The  projections  indicate  that  reform  is  unavoidable  and needs  to  be addressed
soon to  avert  the fast rising  deficits.  Given that  total pension  contributions  are  already
high,  amounting to 26 percent,  there  is clearly  no room for further  increases  that could
induce  negative  labor  market  effects.  Financial  viability  will  have  to  focus  on
constraining  the explosive rise of expenditures and linking them more closely to resource
availability.  The  elimination  of  the  actuarial  imbalances  can  be  achieved  by
implementing  "parametric  reforms"  to the  existing  Defined  Benefit (DB)  system,  or by
8moving towards  a Notional Defined Contribution  (NDC) system.  Either of these reforms
will  invariably  involve  a decline in replacement  ratios,  particularly  for  young  workers,
and a reassessment of current retirement ages.
Ensuring  financial  viability  should  not be  the  sole  objective  of the  reform.  In
evaluating  various  reform options,  policy makers  will need to consider  the adequacy  of
benefits and security  of future retirement  income,  and foster a system that may be more
effective  at enhancing  the incentive  to contribute  and preventing  evasion,  by tightening
the  link between  contributions  and  benefits.  The  following  sections  analyze  different
reform options, bearing in mind the objectives mentioned above.
3.  ALTERNATIVE  REFORMS TO THE PAYG SCHEME
The first set of reform  options focuses  on improving  the existing PAYG scheme
by  modifying  its  key  parameters  while  maintaining  its  DB  structure.  The  scope  for
balancing  the  PAYG  system  through  parametric  reforms  is  assessed  in  this  section
through  the  simulation  of two  specific  reform  packages.  The  first,  labeled  as  mild
parametric reform,  comprises  a change to CPI indexation  of pensions  in 2002;  a further
and gradual  increase of the retirement  age to 63  by 2010  for both men and  women;  and
the  elimination  of service  credit  for  future  students.  The  second,  labeled  as  strong
parametric  reform,  includes  all  these  elements  plus  a  freeze  in  the  flat  pension.  The
section  also discusses  alternative  designs to the DB formula that  can strengthen the link
between contributions  and benefits and possibly address incentive problems.
In the mild  reform package,  the equalization  of the retirement  age will not only
help  contain  expenditures  but  will  also treat  male  and  female  participants  more  fairly
within the system.  Many transition economies  have already moved in this direction  e.g.,
Hungary  as noted  earlier.  EU  countries  are  also  eliminating  this  gap  in line  with  EU
principles  that do not permit gender discrimination. 12 Simulations on the retirement  age
increase maintain a one-year gap between the effective  or average retirement  age and the
statutory level  in accordance with observed retirement patterns.  The number of working
years  is raised  along  with  changes  in the  statutory  retirement  age.  The policy of non-
contributory periods  is also generous  in terms of social  circumstances  that merit special
credits, the choice of reference  wage, and duration.  Credits for non-contributory  periods
should  be  debated  in the  context of the  reform  to reevaluate  which of these  programs
remain  a  social  priority  after  accounting  for  their  costs.  For  the  purpose  of  the
simulations,  we modeled the elimination  of student periods since this provision loses its
justification  in  a  market  economy  and  could  result  in  unintended  and  perverse
redistribution from low-income, unskilled workers to high-income,  skilled workers.  13,14
12 For example, the United Kingdom will redress the 5-year retirement age gap over a two-decade period,
bringing the retirement age to 65 years by 2020.
13  There  is  strong  evidence  that  earnings  and  the  level  of education  are  positively correlated  in  market
economies.  See e.g., Krueger and Lindahl (2001).  The foregone years of contribution  due to time invested
in  higher  education  will  be  more  than  offset  by  the  higher  replacement  rate  obtained  through  stronger
earnings.
14 Annex 4 presents a summary of individuals that are eligible for non-contributory  periods.
9The  mild  reform  package  would  generate  substantive  improvements  in  the
financial  viability  of the  system,  as  indicated  in  Figure  5.  The pension  system  would
even experience  a period of surpluses from 2006-07 through 2020.  However, this reform
package would  not achieve  long-term  stability.  Deficits would re-emerge  in 2020,  and
would remain  sizable  in the long-run,  as high as  3.5  percent  of GDP in the year  2050.
The mild DB reform  would  fail  to restore the  long-run balance  of the PAYG because,
inter alia, of its failure to arrest the dramatic increase in the system's dependency ratio to
any significant  extent.  As shown in Figure 6, the dependency ratio would still increase to
100 percent  by 2050,  almost double  its present level,  despite the  further  increase  in the
retirement age to 63 for both men and women.
The option to  strengthen the package of parametric  reforms would be to increase
the retirement age even further,  say, to 65 or 67 years of age.  Although several European
countries  have  already  raised  the retirement  age to  these  levels,  this is a measure  that
could  face  political  opposition.  If  further  increases  in  the  retirement  age  were  not
possible (above and beyond those contained  in the "mild reform"),  it would be necessary
to decrease the  system's  average  replacement  rate.  Thus,  a second and  stronger reform
package was modeled comprising the above reforms plus a freeze  in the flat pension that
reduces  the  average  entry  pension  from  48  percent  in  2000  to  39  percent  in  2040.
(Previous  scenarios  assumed  that the flat pension-currently  equal  to  10 percent  of the
average wage-is indexed to nominal wage  growth, thus maintaining  its level relative to
wages.)
Figure 5: Simulation of Parametric  DB Reforms,  2000-2070
(Balance  of the Public PAYG as percent of GDP)
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Source:  World Bank estimates.
As  shown  in  Figure  5,  the  stronger  reform  package  would  be  able  to  attain
financial  stability through the mid-2030s,  but would still be  unable to avert deficits after
the  second  demographic  shock.  The  PAYG  scheme  would  improve  at  the  end of the
projection  period  reaching  a  balanced  position,  but this  result  is  due  to  the  assumed
10increase  in the fertility rate, which may  or may not materialize.  Therefore,  although the
strong reform package would enhance significantly the long-run financial  performance of
the  PAYG  scheme,  the  system  would  remain  vulnerable  to  uncertainties  in  future
economic and demographic trends.  The sensitivity  analysis presented  in Annex III shows
that under more pessimistic  demographic  assumptions  the  reformed  DB  scheme  would
still run  large deficits  in the long run.  The sensitivity of PAYG DB  balances to shocks
that cannot  be  predicted  with  any reasonable  accuracy  raises the  question  of whether
there are alternative PAYG systems that can be more robust to unforeseen shocks.
Figure 6: PAYG System  Dependency  Ratio, 2000-2070
(pensionerslinsured,  in percent)
130.0
120.0
- Current scheme  -i-Mild  DB  reformm
Source:  World Bank estimates.
The  parametric  reforms  presented  above  primarily  focused  on  the  scheme's
financial  stability.  Another important issue that needs to be addressed is the link between
contributions  and benefits.  There has been  a decompression  of the earnings  distribution
in  the  labor  market  since  the  start  of  the  transition  from  communism  in  1990.
Participants  in  the  PAYG  scheme  with  above-average  earnings  and  contributions  may
exert  a  growing  pressure  to  enjoy  simiilar  differentials  on  their  pension  benefits,
especially  given  the  high  contribution  rates  paid  into  the  system.  A  very  compressed
pension  structure  may  weaken  contribution  incentives,  particularly  among  the  self-
employed,  who  will  tend  to  declare  and  contribute  the  minimum  assessment  base
regardless  of their  underlying  earnings.  Other  transition  economies  with  compressed
benefit  formulas  have  shifted  to  greater  benefit  differentiation  according  to  historical
earnings,  e.g.  Hungary  by  modifying  the  structure  of the  DB  formula  and  Poland  by
introducing  an NDC scheme.'5 In recent reforms,  some EU countries,  e.g.,  Sweden and
Italy,  have  also  strengthened  the  contribution  and  benefit  link  to  minimize  labor
distortions  and  encourage  longer  working  careers  along  with  improvements  in  life
expectancy.' 6 Therefore,  whereas  the  degree  of redistribution  in the  pension  system  is
B5  oth countries also introduced a second pillar.  see Palacios  and Rocha (ibid), Rocha and Vittas  (ibid)
and Chlon, Gora, Rutkowski  (1999).
16  Both countries also introduced NDCs.  see e.g., Palmer (2002),  Brugiavini (2001),  and Franco (2002).
110.0~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~1ultimately a societal  choice, the Czech pension system may have to follow developments
in the labor market and gradually move to a less redistributive  structure.
The "strong"  DB  reform  scenario  presented helps to diminish  the high degree  of
redistribution by freezing the flat component of the benefit formula.  But the reform does
not modify the earnings  related  component,  which remains  highly redistributive.  There
are alternative DB reforms that would achieve similar PAYG balances, but that would tie
more  closely  contributions  and benefits.17 The  increase  could  be done  progressively,
over  a 20  to  30  year  period,  permitting  a  gradual  shift  from  the highly  redistributive
scheme to a decompressed benefit structure.
Most  of  the  countries  that  have  decompressed  their  benefit  formulas  have
simultaneously introduced a minimum pension guarantee to prevent  low-income workers
from  falling  into  poverty.  There  has  been  a tendency  to use  general  tax  revenues  to
finance  this  guarantee  as well  as  other  social  programs that the  system  might  support,
e.g.,  non-contributory  periods  for  child  care  in  early  years.'8 From  a  public  policy
perspective,  this  approach  fosters  greater  transparency  of costs  and  makes  it  easier  for
society  to  determine  priorities  among  social  programs.  Equity  considerations  also
support  the financing  of these  social programs  from  general  revenues rather than  social
security  contributions,  since  the  former  are levied  on  a broader  tax base-capital  and
labor.
Alternative Approaches to PAYG Reforms:  The NDC model
In  recent  years,  a  number  of European  countries-Sweden,  Poland,  Italy,  and
Latvia-have  introduced  an  NDC  structure  in  their  PAYG  systems.'9 If  properly
designed,  the  NDC  structure  can  attain  greater  financial  stability  than  DB-PAYG
schemes,  by  incorporating  some  automatic  stabilizers  to  changing  demographic  and
economic  conditions.  A properly  designed NDC system is also an effective mechanism
to  tighten  the  link  between  contributions  and  benefits,  an  additional  objective  of the
reforms  mentioned  above  that  sought  to  minimize  labor  market  distortions  and  other
incentive problems.
The  NDC  model  remains  a  PAYG  financing  scheme,  but  contributions  are
recorded  in  individual  accounts  and  a notional  interest  rate  is  credited  to the  notional
accumulated  balances.  The  growth rate  of the  covered  wage  bill  constitutes  the  best
choice  for the notional  interest rate,  since  the system's revenues  fluctuate  along with it.
17 Referring to footnote 7, the revised benefit formula could, for example,  contain an increase in the weights
attached to segments two and three of the wage assessment  base combined  with a reduction  in the accrual
rate.  The latter  would offset the  increase  in the average  reference  wage  produced  by the higher weights
attached to segments two and three.
18  In Sweden, Hungary and Poland, the pension schemes comprise  a minimum pension guarantee  financed
from general  tax revenues.  The  Swedish,  Polish  and Italian  systems  also credit  non-contributory  periods,
primarily for child birth and unemployment,  but length duration is generally shorter.
19  See Chlon,  Gora, Rutkowski  (1999), Palmer (2002), Fox and Palmer (1999) and Brugiavini  (2001)  for a
discussion of the Polish,  Swedish, Latvian and Italian NDC reforms.  Note that  Sweden,  Poland and Latvia
also introduced  a second pillar along with the NDC.
12By contrast  to  fully funded  DC  schemes,  funds  recorded  in the  accounts  are  notional.
The entry pension  is  calculated  by multiplying  the notional  balance  accumulated  in the
NDC account by an  annuity conversion factor,  which varies  according to the age  of the
retiree.20  As  life  expectancy  increases,  the  estimated  entry  pension  is  automatically
adjusted downwards,  making the system more resilient to longevity risk.  Individuals who
are  targeting  a  specific  replacement  rate  are  induced  to  work  longer.21  The  basic
principles of the NDC model are summarized in the formula below:
S  cwj  (I+  ij))
Pr  F=  where:
Pr  entry pension for individual retiring at age r
c  contribution rate
w,  contribution base in year i
Ij  indexation of notional capital in yearj
n  age entering social security system
Fr  annuity factor dependent on life expectancy at age r,  pension indexation,
and the expected notional interest rate credit after retirement.
These  automatic  adjustments  introduce  flexibility  in  the  system  and  greater
financial  stability to cope with changes in labor and demographic trends.22 Critics of the
NDC system,  e.g.,  Disney  (2000) and Valdes-Prieto  (2000),  claim that the PAYG  could
still display  imbalances  over  short-term  periods  due to  lags in the impact  of automatic
stabilizers and argue that a DB model can also attain long-term stability through repeated
adjustments  to the benefit  formula.  Whereas these arguments  are valid, they also fail  to
account  for  the  political  and  credibility  costs  of implementing  continuous  legislative
amendments  to  a  pension  system.  Note  also  that  the  Swedish  NDC  scheme  also
incorporates  a  special  'balance  index'  that  seeks  to  correct  any  sources  of short-term
imbalances.23
20  The  annuity  factor  is  also  dependent  on  the  expected  pension  indexation  and  the expected  notional
interest rate credit after retirement.  For example, in the Swedish NDC system, the annuity factor takes into
account  projections  for real economic  growth,  highly correlated  with the  growth  rate of the  contribution
base as long as the contribution base is not forever decreasing.  Benefits are later indexed to inflation.
21  Minimizing  labor market distortions of the pension schemes and encouraging individuals to work longer
along with longevity  improvements  were  important objectives of the Swedish  and Italian reforms (Palmer
(ibid)  and  Brugiavini  (ibid).  See  also Blondal  and  Scarpetta (1998)  and  Boeri,  Brugiavini  and Maignan
(2001)  for a discussion on retirement  incentives.
22 See Palmer and Gora (2001)  for a more extensive description of the NDC model.
23  When the current valuation of assets fails to meet the valuation  of liabilities  and their ratio (or  'balance
index')  falls below unity, both pensions and  'nominal account balances' of contributors are deflated by the
difference  between this ratio and unity.  The  Swedish National  Insurance  Board has performed simulations
under a wide variety of system  shocks to assess the resilience of the 'balance index'.  See Settergren  (2001)
and Palmer (2002) for a further discussion of the index.
13The  conversion  from  a  DB  to  an  NDC  structure  in  the  Czech  PAYG  was
simulated  assuming that  the  NDC pension  is gradually phased in over a 40-year  period,
while the DB pension is gradually phased out.  However, disability and survivor pensions
remain  DB.  Two sets  of simulations  were performed,  the first  assuming no parametric
reforms  and  the  second  assuming  the  introduction  of the  same  parametric  reforms
discussed above.
More specifically, the first simulation is based on the following working assumptions:
*  Notional accounts are introduced in the year 2003 with a zero opening balance;24
*  Notional  accounts are credited with a notional interest rate equal to the growth of
the wage bill (growth of contributors plus average  wage growth);
*  Upon  retirement,  the  pension  is  determined  as  the  sum of two  components:  a
pension  determined  from  the  notional  account  and  a  residual  DB  pension
calculated  by applying  the existing  old-age pension  formula to all  service  years
accrued prior to 2003.  The flat pension is frozen at  1310 Crowns.
*  The  notional  account  pension  is  determined  by dividing  each worker's  notional
account  balance  by  an annuity  factor that  reflects projected  mortality rates,  the
rate  of pension  indexation  equal  to projected  inflation,  and the notional  interest
rate  equivalent  to the projected  growth  rate  of the  covered  wage  bill. Thus, the
model implicitly assumes perfect foresight.
*  The  conversion  to NDC  is not accompanied  by a retirement age  increase  nor  a
change in the method  of indexation.  The sole parametric  reform implemented  in
this scenario is the freezing of the flat pension.
The second simulation assumes that the transition to NDC is accompanied  by the
same  parametric  reforms  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  i.e.,  a  switch  to  inflation
indexation,  an  increase  in  the  retirement  age  to  63,  and  the  abolishment  of credits for
student  years.  In  addition,  the second  simulation  includes a minimum pension equal  to
25 percent of the average economy-wide wage to protect the life-time poor.
As  shown in Figure  7,  the implementation  of notional  accounts  would eliminate
the actuarial imbalances  of the pension system in the long run, even if the retirement age
is  not increased  and the  method  of pension  indexation  remains  unchanged.  The NDC
system  would  be  able  to  adapt  itself  automatically  to  the  demographic  shocks  and
eventually  reduce  benefits  to  the  levels  required  to  balance  the  pension  system.
However, the  simulations also show that, without  parametric  reforms,  the elimination of
the  imbalances  would  take  more  than  50  years,  and  during  this  period  the  pension
systems would still run sizable deficits.
24 The contribution rate is divided into two components:  a 20 percent contribution rate designated  as the DC
component  and  recorded  in  the  notional  account,  and  the  remaining  6  percent  designated  as  a  DB
component to cover disability and survivor benefits.
14Figure 7: Simulation of the NDC  model
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If an increase  in the retirement age to 63, a switch to inflation indexation,  and the
reduction  in  non-contributory  years  accompany  the  NDC  introduction,  the  pension
system would be stabilized both  in the  short and long  runs, as Figure  7 shows.  These
results indicate that the parametric reforms would ensure a much faster elimination of the
financial  imbalances  of the  pension  system,  and  should  be  regarded  as  a  necessary
complement to the NDC reform.
The NDC system would be able adapt itself better to demographic shocks than the
DB  system,  whether  these shocks  are well  predicted  or not.  This is  because  the NDC
structure has built-in financial  stabilizers (the notional interest rate and the annuity factor)
that  lead  to  adjustments  in  the  replacement  rates  as  economic  and  demographic
conditions  fluctuate..  This  is  further  confirmed  in the  sensitivity  analysis  presented  in
Annex  III,  which  shows  a better performance  of the  NDC  compared  to  the DB,  even
under highly adverse demographic conditions.
The NDC  structure closely  links contributions  and benefits, as shown in Table  4.
The ratios of pensions  over personal  wage  would become more uniform  across different
income groups, and the ratios of pensions over the average  wage in the economy would
show a greater  dispersion.  The  excessive mismatch  between  contributions  and benefits
for the  self-employed  and  higher  income  workers  would  be avoided,  possibly reducing
the incentives for evasive behavior by these classes of workers.  However, the balancing
of the PAYG would inevitably entail  lower replacement  rates across  all income classes,
reflecting the  low implicit  rate of return of the  balanced  PAYG  system.  Note that the
simulations  incorporate  a minimum pension  guarantee  equivalent  to 25  percent  of the
average wage to prevent pensioners with lifetime earnings from receiving pensions below
the poverty  line. For this reason,  the replacement rate  as percent of the personal  wage is
25 The NDC simulations generate a small surplus in the long term because approximately  10 percent of
contributors die before reaching retirement age, and consequently do not receive an NDC pension.  Thus,
the average  notional interest rate paid to all contributors is below the sustainable rate of GDP growth.
15the same for the average  and high income worker  (32 percent)  but the rate for the low income
worker is higher (50 percent).
Table 4: Replacement  Rates Across Wage Levels  Under the NDC  Reform (in%)
Pension/Personal  Wage  Pension/Average  Wage
Personal  Wage/Average  Wage  Current  2050  Current  2050
50  77  50  39  25
100  48  32  48  32
150  34  32  51  48
Note:  Values  in 2050  reflect the  NDC system  supported  by a  minimum  pension guarantee  equal  to 25  percent of
average wage.  For  an analysis of replacement  rate sensitivity to changes  in economic  and demographic
assumptions, please see Annex V.
Source: World Bank estimates
The  NDC  and  DB  simulations  have  illustrated  various  options  for  attaining
financial  viability,  minimizing  distortions  within  the  scheme,  and  treating  individuals
fairly on the  basis  of their past  contribution  histories.  A DB  fornula  can  replicate  in
principle  many of the characteristics  of the NDC,  but this would  require more  frequent
changes  in  the  benefit  formula.  In  this  regard,  the  NDC  capacity  to  accommodate
unforeseen  shocks  becomes  an  attractive  feature.  The  DB  system  is politically  more
dependent  and the restoration of financial viability in the event of unpredicted shocks can
become a slower and more arduous process.
If  reforms  are  not  delayed,  a  gradual  transition  period  is  viable  and  the
transformation from  a compressed  to an earnings related  formula can  be smooth.  These
simulations also highlight the unavoidable fall in the replacement rate-32 percent of the
personal  wage  for  a worker  earning  the average  wage-and  the vital need  to create  the
proper  environment  for supplementary  pension plans  to  grow, particularly  for  younger
workers  who  will suffer the brunt of this adjustment.  A related  question to  analyze  is
whether supplementary pensions will be sufficient by themselves to compensate workers
for the  decline  in the  PAYG replacement  rate  or additional  measures  (e.g.,  mandating  a
funded pillar) might be advisable.  The next two sections address these issues.
4.  STRENGTHENING  THE THIRD PILLAR
The Structure and  Performance of  the Third Pillar
The Czech Republic  introduced  private  pension funds  in  1994,  becoming  one of
the  first  Central  European  countries  to  introduce  supplementary  private  pension
provision.  Participation has been encouraged through the payment of a State contribution
that  adds between  30 to  50  percent of the amount  contributed  by participants,  favoring
low-income  workers.  The  number  of affiliates  is  roughly  2.3  million  workers.  The
pension  funds are joint stock companies  organized  as profit participation funds.  Under
this legal  construction,  pension funds have  shareholders  and plan participants  holding a
common  asset  pool  and  sharing  profits  from  investment  income.  Participation  in the
16system is based on individual contracts and switching across funds is allowed.  There has
been an impressive  consolidation of the pension industry  in recent years,  as indicated by
the reduction  in the number of licensed  funds  from  44 in  1995  to 20  in 2000.  Despite
some  positive  features,  ihe  Czech  third  pillar  remains  deficient  in  many  aspects-
especially  low participation  of younger  workers,  disappointing  rates of return  and slow
asset growth, and deficient regulation--and  there are doubts about its capacity  to become
a significant and reliable source of supplementary retirement income.
Although  the total number  of affiliates  (2.5  million)  is roughly equivalent  to  50
percent of the  labor force, nearly  20 percent of affiliates  are  above  60 years of age and
retired, an  outcome that reflects the weak links between plan rules and normal retirement
rules.  The average  age of participants  is nearly  49 years,  well above the  average  age of
mandatory  schemes  in Hungary,  Poland, and several Latin American  countries, which is
around 35  years of age.  As shown in Figure  8, less than 20 percent of workers under 35
years of age participate in the third pillar, a source of concern,  as these  are precisely the
generations  that will be more  affected  by the  inevitable  reforms  to the PAYG  scheme,
and that will be more dependent on supplementary  sources of retirement income.
Figure 8: Third Pillar Coverage by Age  Group
(Number of participants  divided by population  in each age group)
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Source: Czech Ministry of Finance, Office of Pension Fund Supervision,  and CCSO
In addition to the narrow coverage  of younger  workers,  average  contributions  to
the system have remained small-below  3 percent of average  wages  (Table 5).  Largely
because  of the low level of contributions,  total  assets have  grown at only 0.3  percent of
GDP p.a. in the recent years and amounted  to only 2.3 percent of GDP at end-2000,  after
seven years of operation.
17Table 5: Number of Participants,  Average Contributions, and Total Assets
in the Third Pillar,  1994-2000
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Number of participants  (in thousands)  183.3  1290.1  1564.2  1637.6  1740.1  2006.3  2298.3
Average contribution/average  wage  (%)  1.71  2.51  2.94  2.94  2.81  2.38  2.45
Total Assets/GDP  (%)  0.10  0.51  1.52  1.39  1.73  2.04  2.32
Source:  Czech  Ministry of Finance, Office of Pension Fund Supervision
The  low  average  real  returns  and  the  relatively  high  operating  costs  have  also
contributed  to the slow pace  of asset accumulation.  As shown  in Table  6, the average
yearly  real  return  has  amounted  to  only  0.8-1.4  percent  p.a.,  depending  on  whether
nominal  returns are  deflated  by the average or the end-year variations  in the CPI.  The
average  real  return  has  been  well  below the  growth  rate  of real  wages,  whereas  the
average  real  return of pension  funds in the OECD has been  3-4 percent  above  average
real  wage  growth  in the  last  three  decades  (Rocha,  Gutierrez  and Hinz (2001),  OECD
(1998), and EFRP (1996)).
The low returns of pension funds in the Czech Republic can be explained by their
very conservative  investment policies, which have  favored large holdings of low yielding
bonds and term deposits.  These conservative policies are partly justified by the problems
in the Czech  capital  market  during the  1990s,  caused by an excessive  number  of listed
companies  and  a  flawed  regulatory  framework.26 However,  the  predominance  of low
yielding and liquid instruments in the portfolios of pension funds is also due to the short
time horizon with which asset managers operate-the large participation of older workers
who  can  withdraw  their  balances  with  short  periods  of accumulation  and  the  few
restrictions  for  switching  across  funds lead asset managers to adopt defensive  strategies
favoring  disproportionately  short-termn  and  liquid  assets.  These  investment  policies
operate  to  the  detriment  of  younger  workers,  who  have  a  longer  period  of  asset
accumulation and would greatly benefit from larger equity holdings.
Operating costs have been high around  14-18  percent of contributions,  depending
on whether State contributions  are included or not in the denominator,  and have also held
back the  asset  growth  rate.  These  cost ratios  are  lower than  equivalent  ratios  in Latin
American countries,  but they are higher than cost ratios of occupational  pension funds in
the OECD, that have hovered around  10 percent of contributions.27
26 The World Bank (1999)  and Jelinek and Schneider (1998) provide a detailed  review of the Czech capital
market and the pension fund industry during the 1  990s.
27  See Rocha,  Hinz,  and Gutierrez  (2001).  The  Czech  cost ratios probably  underestimate  actual  costs, as
many pension  funds utilize the sales  force of insurance  companies in  the same financial  group.  Excluding
promotion  and  acquisition costs,  operating costs have been around 9 percent of contributions, in line with
the costs of occupational  funds in  the OECD.
18Table 6: Average Yearly Nominal and Real Returns and Real Wage Growth in 1995-2000
(in percent p.a.)
Nominal  Real Return  Real Return
Return  (Average CPI)  (December CPI)  Real  Wage Growth
8.0  0.8  1.4  4.3
Finally, despite the regulatory and supervisory improvements  introduced  in recent
years,  the  regulatory  framework  still contains  many  weaknesses.  Most  worrisome,  the
legal structure establishes a profit participation structure where assets of shareholders  and
participants  are  not segregated  and the distribution  of profits between  shareholders  and
members is not transparent,  with excessive  room for the possible siphoning of resources
from participants,  particularly participants switching across funds.
Strengthening the Third Pillar:  Basic Elements of the Reform Agenda
Enhancing the role of the third pillar and improving its performance  may require a
number  of measures,  including:  (i)  linking  the  rules  of the  private  pension  system  to
retirement;  (ii)  separating  the assets of shareholders  and participants,  by eliminating  the
profit participation  model  and  adopting the  mutual  fund  model;  and  (iii)  strengthening
further the regulatory  framework for the existing  pension funds.  Of these measures,  the
conversion  of the  profit  participation  funds  into  mutual  funds  may  face  some  legal
obstacles.  However, there should be a strong effort to overcome  these, as the conversion
would greatly enhance the  security  and transparency of the  system, to the  benefit of all
participants.  2
One  important  question  that  is  being  addressed  by  the  Czech  authorities  is
whether these reforms  would be able to establish a robust private pension  system with  a
wide coverage of the labor force,  including younger workers, or whether further measures
are called  for,  such as the introduction of occupational  funds that would  operate  side by
side  with the existing  funds.  The  Government  presented  to Parliament  a draft  Law on
Defined  Contribution  (DC)  occupational  funds  but  the  draft  was  not  approved  by
Parliament.  Representatives  of  trade  unions  and  employers  have  been  generally
supportive  of the proposal,  but  many industry participants  have questioned  the need to
introduce another type of pension fund.
The introduction of DC occupational funds merits further consideration as it could
contribute  positively  to  the growth  and performance  of the  private  pillar.29  Based  on
other  international  experiences,  such  a construction  could broaden  the  coverage  of the
labor force (especially  among younger workers),  as there is evidence that employer-based
28  Total  assets  would  be  allocated  to  shareholders  and  participants  proportionately,  shareholders  would
constitute  a  separate  asset  management  company,  and  the  assets  of participants  would  be  placed  on  a
mutual  fund  constituted  as  a  unit  trust.  The  conversion  would  enable  the  more  frequent  valuation  of
participants'  accounts on a mark to market basis, and a transparent  distribution of income and capital gains
among all participants.
29 The DC construction would not impair labor market mobility.  Workers  would be able to easily transfer
their balances when they switch employers, as in the U.S. case.
19funds tend  to induce  higher worker  participation  than  individual  schemes.30 Employer-
based schemes  could also  facilitate an overall  increase in the average  contribution rates,
as  these  plans  usually involve  matching  contributions  by the  employer.  Lastly,  these
plans  could  contribute  to  an  improvement  in  the  industry's  long-run  performance,  by
providing  an  alternative  form  of  pension  provision  at  a  lower  cost,  enhancing
competition,  and  lengthening  the  time  horizon  of asset  managers.  Moreover,  the
increase  in coverage  and  in contribution rates  could create  the conditions  for the  future
introduction  of a mandatory pillar, which do not seem to exist at the present time in the
Czech Republic.31 It goes without saying that these favorable outcomes  would depend on
the quality of the regulatory framework under which these funds operate.32
5.  WILL THIRD PILLAR REFORMS  ENSURE ADEQUATE  REPLACEMENT RATES?
Possible Limitations  of a Strategy Restricted  to Third Pillar  Arrangements
Although the expansion of third pillar coverage  would be a desirable outcome,  it
is  important. to  have  in  mind  the  potential  limitations  of a  pension  reform  strategy
restricted  to  first  pillar  reforms  and  efforts  to  expand  voluntary  arrangements.  The
central  question  that Czech policy-makers  must address  is the extent to which coverage
could be  increased  by voluntary arrangements.  As shown  in Table  7,  there  are  several
developed  countries with a long tradition of private pension provision that have not been
able to increase coverage to levels above half of the labor force, despite the existence of a
variety of private arrangements, proper regulatory frameworks,  and tax incentives.  A few
exceptions  are  Denmark,  Netherlands  and  Sweden,  which  have  been  able  to  ensure
almost universal coverage through collective agreements between unions  and employers.
This  outcome  has  been  due  to  historical  circumstances  and  institutional  arrangements
specific to these three countries, however,  and the possibility for the same outcome to be
replicated  in the Czech Republic  seems rather low.  Therefore,  there is a risk that third
pillar coverage would remain unsatisfactory,  especially among younger workers.
Table 7: Coverage  Rates in Countries with Developed Third Pillars
(participation  in private pension sch  mes as a percent of the labor force)
Participation Increased Through
Collective Agreements
Canada  Ireland  US  Denmark  Netherlands  |  Sweden
33  40  45  75  91  80
Source:  OECD, US Department of Labor,  Irish Pensions Board,  Poskute (2001)  and Palmer (2001)
Note: For the US case, the figure illustrates coverage of full- and part-time workers in  the private sector.
30  See  Springstead  and Wilson (2000) for an analysis of coverage  of occupational  pension schemes  among
young and low income workers in the US.
31  Some  OECD  countries  have  introduced  second  pillars  (mandated  by  a  law)  or  quasi-second  pillars
(mandated  by collective agreements)  based on occupational  funds that were originally strictly voluntary for
the employers.
32  Besides regulations  applying to personal private pension plans, regulations of occupational  pension
schemes would have to pay special attention to governance-a  critical issue to foster the sound
performance of this type of plan.
20The  related  question  is  the  extent  to  which  the  third  pillar  would  provide  a
reasonable  remedy  to the overall  decline  in the first pillar replacement  ratio.  As  shown
above  and  in  Table  8,  uncovered  workers  would  experience  a  sharp  decline  in
replacement  ratios,  on  average  from  the  current  level  of  48  percent  to  32  percent.
Workers  covered  by  the  third  pillar  and  contributing  5  percent  to  their  individual
accounts  would be able  to  stabilize  their replacement  ratios,  assuming that future  third
pillar returns  are increased to the historical  levels  in OECD countries  (around  2 percent
above  wage  growth).  However,  this  stability  of replacement  ratios  would  only  be
achieved  at the cost of high  contribution rates-31  percent,  including  the  first and third
pillars.
Table 8: Average  Replacement  Ratios Under Alternative Multi-Pillar Constructions
Contribution  Rates  Replacement  Rates
NDC  2nd  3rd  Total  2000  2050
Pillar  Pillar
NDC only  26  0  0  26  48  32
NDC + 3  rdpillar  26  0  5  31  48  50
NDC + 2n  pillar  21  5  0  26  48  42
NDC + 2nd and 3rd pillars  21  5  5  31  48  60
Source:  World Bank estimates
Notes: Notional interest rate in the NDC equals  wage bill growth.  Interest rate on second and third pillars
assumed  to  be  equal  to  3 percent  wage  growth  plus  2 percent.  For  an  analysis  of replacement  rate
sensitivity to changes in  economic and demographic  assumptions, please refer to Annex V.
An  alternative  policy  option  that  merits  serious  consideration  would  involve  a
diversion  of  contributions  from  the  reformed  PAYG  scheme  to  the  mandated  fully-
funded  pillar  for  all  workers.  As  Table  8  illustrates,  the  transfer  of  a  5  percent
contribution  rate from  the PAYG  to the  second  pillar could  almost stabilize the  overall
replacement  rate for all workers  due to the higher expected  rate of return of the  funded
pillar compared to the implicit rate of return of a balanced  PAYG.  Workers participating
in a supplementary  system,  e.g.,  contributing  an additional  5 percent to the third pillar,
could then attain even higher replacement rates of 60 percent.
To secure an adequate retirement income for younger generations, many countries
have  adopted multi-pillar  reforms with  greater  reliance  on  funded pillars.  Neighboring
countries  such  as  Hungary  and  Poland  have  already  adopted  a  multi-pillar  system
introducing  a  mandatory  funded  pillar  along  with  the  voluntary  pillar  at  an  early
development  stage.  Sweden  has  also  established  a  mandatory  funded  pillar,  financed
with a contribution  rate of 2.5 percent that complements  mandatory occupational pension
plans  with  an  average  contribution  rate  of 3.5  percent.33 The  United  Kingdom  also
permits individuals to opt out of the earnings-related  component of the PAYG  scheme by
either joining an occupational  plan or a private  pension plan;  the optional  diversion of a
33  Therefore,  the total  contribution  to funded  pillars  in Sweden  is 6 percent.  Contribution  rates  to  the
PAYG are  16 percent.
21share  of mandatory  PAYG contributions to the  funded pillar is an alternative that merits
study within the set of reforms available for the Czech pension system.
The recent German  and Italian reforms of the PAYG pillar that will also entail  a
decline  in  replacement  rates,  particularly  for  younger  workers,  were  combined  with  a
reform of their supplementary  pillars to halt this decline.  Brugiavini (2001)  and Wagner
(2001)  in their respective  assessments  of the Italian  and  German  reforms  pose the risk
that  younger  workers  might  not be  adequately  covered  by the  supplementary  pension
funds.  Thus,  third  pillar  pensions  might  not  be  sufficient  to  offset  the  decline  in the
PAYG  replacement  ratio-a  risk  might  also  materialize  in the  Czech  Republic  if the
reform only relies on the expansion of the third pillar.
Simulations of a Two-Pillar  Mandatory  system: NDC Paired  with a Funded  Pillar
For illustrative  purposes,  this section  presents  some  simulations  of a two-pillar
reform of the mandatory  system, assuming that the reform would involve a combination
of the NDC system with a funded pillar.  More  specifically,  the simulations  assume that
there would be a gradual transition from DB to NDC, beginning  in 2003,  as described  in
section 3, and that the  second pillar would be introduced in 2005 by diverting a 5 percent
contribution  rate from the PAYG to the funded pillar.  The simulations also assume that
only workers under 40 years of age would be shifted to the mixed  system (i.e.,  workers
born after 1965).
As  shown  in  Figure  9,  the  early  implementation  of the  NDC  with  parametric
reforms  would  create  sufficient  savings early on to permit the introduction  of a second
pillar.  During the  transition  period,  deficits  in the PAYG  system would emerge  from
2020 through 2050  but would be manageable,  hovering  around  0.5 percent during most
of  this  period.  Moreover,  these  transitional  deficits  would  not  have  adverse
macroeconomic  consequences,  as  they would be  outweighed  by the increase  in private
savings (i.e.,  the contributions  to the second pillar).  Indeed,  the total private and public
savings effect of the NDC and second-pillar reform would be positive in the first decades,
and roughly equivalent to the positive balances of the mono-pillar NDC reform shown in
Figure  7 and reproduced  in Figure 9.34
34 Total pension savings resulting from a multi-pillar reform are roughly equal to the balance of the PAYG
after the parametric/NDC  reforms but before the introduction of the second pillar.  This is because the loss
of revenues to the second pillar (an increase in  public deficit) and the contributions to the second pillar (an
increase in private savings) tend to offset each other.  See Rocha and Vittas (2002) for a more detailed
analysis of the Hungarian pension reform.  Kotlikoff(I 998) presents an analysis of transition of different
financing strategies.
22Figure  9:  Transition to Second  Pillar Reform,  2000-2070
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6.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
The paper reviews the challenges  facing the Czech  pension system  and examines
alternative  reform  scenarios.  The paper  shows that the  current  financial  deficits  of the
DB PAYG will rise at a fast pace as the aging demographics  puts ever growing pressure
on the  system.  Continuing  the  small  reform  steps of the  1990s will  be insufficient  to
redress  the  severity  of  the  financial  imbalances;  continuous  but  incomplete  policy
reforms will also erode the confidence of younger workers on the system as the scheme's
rules are repeatedly amended.  The pension system calls for profound reforms.
The  paper  examines  two  main  alternative  reforms  to  the  PAYG  scheme  that
would bring stability to the pension system in the long-nm.  The first would involve a set
of strong parametric  reforms  to the DB  scheme,  including an  increase  in the  retirement
age to 63  years, adoption of price indexation, freezing of the flat benefit, and elimination
of non-contributory  years  for  students.  This  DB  parametric  reform  could  also  include
changes  in  the  benefit  formula  so  as  to  further  reduce  the  degree  of redistribution.
Independently  of whether the DB  system  becomes  less redistributive  or not, the  reform
would  entail  a  reduction  in  the  replacement  rate  for  all  workers.  Maintaining  the
replacement  rate  would  require  further  increases  in  the  retirement  age  that  might  be
difficult to introduce.
Alternatively,  the  DB  system  could  be  gradually  transformed  into  an  NDC
system.  A reform  restricted  to  the introduction  of an  NDC scheme  would take  a long
time to eliminate  the PAYG  imbalances,  however.  Therefore,  it would  be necessary  to
combine the NDC with some parametric reforms such as an increase in the retirement age
to ensure both the  short- and  long-run stability of the pension system.  One advantage  of
the NDC reform over the parametric  DB reform lies in the greater resilience of the NDC
scheme to demographic  fluctuations.  The NDC scheme would also automatically  ensure
23a tighter  link  between  benefits  and  contributions,  which  may  be  an  objective  of the
reform.  Attaining the same results in the DB scheme would require more changes  in the
benefit  formula  which  may  be  more  difficult  to  implement.  However,  the  NDC  cum
parametric  reform  would  also  entail  a reduction  in  replacement  rates,  particularly  for
younger workers.  This is the side-effect of any reform restricted to changes in the PAYG
scheme, regardless of whether the PAYG remains DB or is converted into an NDC.
In order to avoid an excessive decline  in future replacement  ratios,  Czech policy-
makers should  step up ongoing  efforts to improve  the  structure  and performance  of the
third pillar,  to increase  coverage  of younger workers  (who will suffer the largest cuts in
the replacement rate), and to expand average  contribution rates.  The introduction of DC
occupational funds could contribute to the achievement of these objectives.  However, the
increase in coverage  and in the average contribution may still prove  insufficient to ensure
an adequate replacement  ratio for young and unborn generations.  For this reason, Czech
policy-makers  should  maintain  open  the  alternative  to  introduce  a mandatory  funded
pillar.  As a starting option, the reform could allow workers who have a preference  for a
more  diversified  pension  portfolio  to  reallocate  a  fraction  of mandatory  contributions
from the PAYG to the funded pillar.
The paper presents  simulations  of a multi-pillar  reform  involving  an NDC  with
parametric  reforms  and the diversion of a 5 percent contribution  to a new second pillar.
Under  baseline  assumptions,  the  NDC  cum parametric  reforms  would produce  a long-
term replacement  rate equivalent to 32 percent for the average-income  worker, while the
two-pillar  system could secure a replacement rate closer to 42 percent.  An early start of
the  PAYG  reforms  will  be  necessary  to  create  a  cushion  for  the  introduction  of the
second pillar.
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27Annex I
A Description Of C-PRISM,
The Czech  Pension Reform Simulation Model
1.  Introduction
The  Czech  Pension  Reform  Simulation  Model  (C-PRISM)  is  a  long-range
forecasting  tool  that  can  simulate  the  impact  of economic,  demographic  and  policy
changes  upon the  operation  of the Czech  Republic's  mandatory  pension  scheme.  The
model  was  developed  through the joint-efforts  of the  World  Bank and  the  Ministry  of
Labor and Social Policy,  and reflects all of the key features of the Czech pension system.
The following pages provide  a brief description of the model's structure,  capabilities and
internal algorithms.
2.  The Model's Basic Structure
C-PRISM  is written in Excel /  Visual  Basic, and  consists of three  files:  an input
file, an output file, and an "engine"  file.  The engine file contains a visual basic computer
program which, when activated, reads the input file, performs the calculations required to
forecast the operation of the pension system, and then writes the results of the forecast to
the output file.
The input file is divided into three sections:  data, assumptions  and policies.  The
data  section  contains  statistics  that  describe  the  current  demographic  and  economic
conditions  of the Czech Republic, as well as the financial condition of the pension system
in  a particular "base  year"  (e.g.  2000).  The assumption section  contains  economic  and
demographic  assumptions  which the user can adjust,  and which  are used to project  the
future development of GDP, wages, employment and the size and age-sex  structure of the
population.  The policy section contains parameters that describe the rules governing the
pension system, such as contribution  rates, retirement ages, benefit formulae and pension
indexation rules.
The output file is divided  into three sections: summary, finance and pension.  The
summary section  contains key economic,  demographic  and pension  system  statistics  for
each year of the forecast.  The finance section comprises a detailed forecast of the pay-as-
you-go  system's revenue, expenditures and implicit pension debt.  If the particular policy
scenario involves a capitalized pillar, then the finance section will also display a forecast
of the contributions, assets and distributions of the capitalized pillar.  The pension section
displays  the  projected  entry35 and  stock36 pensions  for  each  year of the  forecast.  In
addition  to  presenting  pension  averages  computed  across  all  pensioners,  the  pension
35 An "entry" pension is  defined as the pension awarded at time of retirement.
36  A  "stock"  pension  is defined  as the  average pension  computed  across both new  entrants  and those who
were first awarded  their pensions  in  prior years.section also  displays pension averages for different  sub-categories  of pensioners  defined
by type  of pension  (old  age,  disability,  or survivor),  sex,  income  class,  and  financing
system  (PAYG  defined  benefit,  PAYG  defined  contribution,  or  capitalized  defined
contribution).
3.  The Model's Capabilities
C-PRISM  can forecast  the  impact of demographic  and  economic  changes  upon
the operation of the existing PAYG defined benefit system, and can also simulate a wide-
range of policy reform options.  The model has an unlimited time horizon, but is typically
used to generate  80-year  forecasts.  Up to  100  sets of policies  and  assumptions  can  be
neatly stored in the model's "library",  and retrieved  quickly when needed for a particular
simulation.  Similarly,  up to  100  sets of output results can also  be stored  in the library.
Thus,  multiple  simulations  and  sensitivity  analyses  can  be  performed  rapidly  and
conveniently.
The model can simulate the impact of the following types of reforms:
1.  Retirement age increases.
2.  Changes in contribution rates.
3.  Changes in pension indexation.
4.  Changes to PAYG defined benefit formulae.
5.  Changes in the valuation of non-contributory  years37.
6.  The introduction of a notional defined contribution pillar.
7.  The introduction of a capitalized  defined contribution  pillar.
8.  The  replacement  of the  Czech  system's  "flat"  pension  with  a  targeted  minimum
pension.
9.  Any combination of the reforms listed above.
C-PRISM  can simulate  complex reform combinations  such a transition to a two-
pillar  system  in  which  older  workers  remain  in  the  existing  defined  benefit  system,
middle-aged  workers  are  placed  in  a  new  notional  defined  contribution  system,  and
younger  workers  are  moved  a  two-pillar  system  with  a  notional  defined  contribution
component and a capitalized defined contribution component.  In addition, the model can
simulate fast-paced transitions  in which the entire work-force  is immediately placed in  a
new system, slow-paced transitions in which only younger workers enter the new system,
or medium-paced transitions in which a portion of the work-force  initially enters the new
system.  Finally,  the  m-odel  can  simulate  any  level  of "accrued  rights"  valuation  for
workers entering a new-system,  ranging  from the complete  elimination of accrued rights
to full credit for accrued rights.
37  The  Czech pension system provides  students, unemployed  persons  and women  on maternity  leave with
service credit for periods in  which they are not working.  C-PRISM can simulate changes in this policy.
38  The Czech  pension system  has a universal  flat  pension which  is paid to all  pensioners.  In contrast,  a
"targeted"  minimum pension would be paid solely to those pensioners  whose pensions would otherwise  fall
beneath  a particular threshold.
294.  The Model's Internal Algorithms
C-PRISM  forecasts  the  operation  of the  pension  system  as  a  function of user-
inputted  parameters  that  describe  expected  economic  and  demographic  changes.  The
model does not predict  future economic  growth,  future mortality rates or future fertility
rates.  Rather,  these values  are  exogenous  inputs  specified  by the  user.  Therefore,  the
model  could  most  accurately  be  described  as  an  "actuarial"  model  rather  than  an
"economic" model.
The  model's  engine  is  subdivided  into  five  primary  components:  a data  input
module,  a demographic.module,  an economic module,  a pension  system module, and an
output module.  The data module  is  executed  first and reads  data describing  the initial
demographic,  economic  and pension system conditions for a particular  base  year.  After
this data is read, the model enters a "loop"  which cycles forward  in time  from the base
year to the final  year of the projection.  The demographic module,  economic module and
pension module are positioned  inside of this loop, and are executed  once for each year of
the projection.  Thus, the basic "skeleton" of the model is as follows:
(1) Read Data Describing The Initial Conditions
For Each Year From Base Year To Final Year Of Proiection:
(2)  Demographic  Module:  Project population  forward one year
(3)  Economic  Module:  Project GDP, wages and employment forward one year
(4)  Pension Module:  Calculate revenues and expenditures  for the particular projection year
(5) Output Module:  Write results to output file.
Return To Step 2
The demographic  module  is  executed once  each  year of the  forecast,  and uses
user-inputted fertility rates, mortality rates and migration rates to project the size and age-
sex  structure  of the  population  forward  one  year.  Thus, .each time  the  demographic
module  is  executed,  the  population  is projected  forward  in time from year  "x"  to  year
"x+l".
Similarly,  the  economic  module  is executed  once each  year of the forecast,  and
calculates  GDP,  the average  economy-wide wage,  and the number of employed  persons
by age and sex.  To calculate the number of employed, the population at each age and sex
is multiplied by an age-sex  specific labor force participation rate, and this product is then
multiplied  by one minus the age-sex  specific unemployment  rate.  Labor force rates and
unemployment  rates  are entered  exogenously  by  the user.  At the  user's  discretion,  an
option may  be  activated  which partially  endogenizes  labor  force  rates to  automatically
estimate  the  impact  of retirement  age  increases.  In  addition,  the  calculation  of either
wage growth or GDP growth (but not both simultaneously)  can also be endogenized.  In
this case, the model uses a simple algorithm to ensure the harmonization  of GDP growth,
wage growth and employment growth.
30The pension  module is executed  after the execution of the economic module, and
performs  a  complex  chain  of  calculations  necessary  to  calculate  the  revenues,
expenditures,  and  pensions of the  PAYGO  system,  as well  as  the contributions,  assets,
distributions  and  pensions  of the  capitalized  pillar  (if the  particular  policy  scenario
involves capitalization).
The pension module's calculations  are too numerous and too complex to list here,
but one  aspect of the module's calculations  should be elaborated  because of its particular
importance.  Rather than calculating  pensions  simply for retiring workers at the average
income  level,  C-PRISM  uses  a  wage  distribution  to  calculate  pensions  for  retiring
workers  at  a  variety  of different  wage  levels.  This  is  of  critical  importance  when
modeling the Czech pension system,  since the existing benefit  formula is extraordinarily
redistributive,  yielding  very  high  replacement  rates  for  persons  at  low  wage  levels
(relative  to the  average  wage)  and  low replacement  rates for persons  at  relatively  high
wage  levels.  Reform  options  involving  the  introduction  of a  notional  or  capitalized
defined contribution system  would have a profound impact on the distribution of pension
income.  In such a reform, the introduction of a minimum pension to provide support  for
the lifetime  poor might  be necessary.  To model  the effects  of transforming  the  system
from highly re-distributive  to non-redistributive  (or less re-distributive),  a distribution of
wage levels is therefore  essential.
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ECONOMIC AND  DEMOGRAPHIC ASSUMPTIONS
2000  1  2005  2010  1  2015  1  2020  2025  1  2030  1  2040  2050  2060  2070
Real Wage Growth
Pess  2.0%  2.0%  2.0%  2.0%  2.0%  2.0%  2.0%  2.0%  2.0%  2.0%  2.0%
Base  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%
Opt  4.0%  4.0%  4.0%  4.0%  4.0%  4.0%  4.0%  4.0%  4.0%  4.0%  4.0%
Emplo  ment Growth
Pess  o.  0/%  -0.1%  -0.4%  -0.7%  -0.8  -1.1%  -1.2%  -1.7%  -1.6%  -1.3%  -1.4%
Base  0.0%  0.1%  -0.2%  -0.5%  -0.6%  -0.7%  -0.8%  -1.1%  -0.9%  -0.6%  -0.8%
Opt  0.0%  0.1%  -0.2%  -0.5%  -0.5%  -0.6%  -0.6%  -0.8%  -0.4%  -0.1%  -0.3%
For all scenarios:  Real GDP growth = real wage growth + employment growth
For all scenarios:  Unemployment  rate = 8.8% constant
Total Fertility Rate
Pess  1.17  1.25  1.30  1.40  1.40  1.40  1.40  |  1.40  1.40  1.40  1.40
Base  1.17  1.32  1.45  1.52  1.55  1.55  1.55  1.55  1.55  1.55  1.55
Opt  1.17  1.40  1.60  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.80
Average Lifetime Men
Pess  71.1  72.4  74.0  75.0  77.0  78.0  79.0  |  80.0  81.0  81.0  81.0
Base  71.1  72.4  73.7  74.8  76.0  77.0  78.0 . 79.0  80.0  80.0  80.0
Opt  71.1  72.4  73.0 1  74.0  . 75.0  . 76.0  77.0  |  78.0  79.0  n  79.0  79.0
Average  Lifetime Women
Pess  78.1  T  79.3  81.0  82.0  83.0  84.0  85.0  85.5  86.0  86.0  86.0
Base  78.1  79.3  80.6  81.6  82.7  83.5  84.4  85.0  85.0  85.0  85.0
Opt  78.1  l  79.3  l  80.0  l  81.0  82.0  l  83.0  84.0  84.0  84.0  84.0  84.0
Net Migration Into Czech  Republic As A Percent Of Total Population
Pess  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Base  J  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%
Opt  J  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%
The  base  case  demographic  assumptions  closely  approximate  the  base  case
assumptions  developed  by  the  Department  of Demography  and  Geodemography.  The
pessimistic  assumptions were constructed  by decreasing fertility rates and increasing  life
expectancies  relative  to the  base  case scenario.  Conversely,  the optimistic  assumptions
were  constructed by increasing fertility rates and decreasing life expectancies  relative to
the  base  case  scenario.  Thus,  the  scenarios  are  pessimistic  or  optimistic  from  the
perspective  of PAYGO  financing,  because a PAYGO  system is more financially  sound if
fertility rates are high and life expectancies are low.
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SUMMARY OF POLICY REFORM OPTIONS:
ANALYSIS OF SENSITIVITY  TO DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS
Figure  A.2-a: Financial Perfornance  of the Public Pillar
without Reforms, 2000-2070 (as percent of GDP)
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Figure A.2-b: Financial Performance of the Public Pillar with
Strong-DB Parametric Reforms and No Redistribution, 2000-2070
(as percent of GDP)
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(continued)
Figure A-2-c:  Financial Performance  of the Public Pillar
with Transition to NDC and Parametric Reforms,  2000-2070
(as percent of GDP)
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Fgure A.2-d: Financial Performance of the Public Pillar with
Transition to NDC and Second Pillar Reforms, 2000-2070
(as percent of GDP)
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Non-contributory Periods and Number of Eligible  Individuals
Category of Non-Contributory Periods  Estimated Number of Persons per Year
Registered unemployed  400,000
Sickness benefit recipients  320,000
Child caring period  . 310,000
Full disability till normal retirement age  240,000
Students  in higher education  140,000
Basic and substitute military service  40,000




NDC And DC Entry Replacement  Rates Under Different
Economic  and Demographic Scenarios
1.  NDC  Entry Replacement  Rates Across  Wage Levels  Under  Different
Economic  and Demographic Scenarios  (2050)
NDC Contribution Rate = 26%
Personal Wage/  Pension/Personal  Wage
Average Wage  Pessimistic  Base Case  Optimistic
Assumptions  Assumptions  Assumptions
50%  50%*  50%*  50%*
100%  25%*  32%  43%
150%  23%  32%  43%
*The replacement rates reflect  the minimum pension  guarantee equivalent to 25% of the average wage.
The table shows that more (less) favorable  economic  and demographic  conditions
lead to higher (lower) replacement  rates within an NDC system.  The set of demographic
and economic  assumptions applied in each scenario are presented in Annex II.  Under all
three  scenarios,  the NDC  pension  for workers  earning  50 percent  of the average  wage
falls below 25 percent of the average wage in the economy and thus must be supported by
the minimum pension guarantee.  Note that the 26 percent contribution rate is divided into
two  components:  a  20  percent  contribution  rate  designated  as the  DC  component  and
recorded  in  the  notional  account,  and  the  remaining  6  percent  designated  as  a  DB
component to cover disability and survivor benefits.
2.  Average  Entry Replacement Rates Under Alternative Multi-Pillar
Constructions (2050).
Contribution Rates  Pension / Personal Wage
2nd  3rd  Pes  Base  Opt
NDC  Pillar  Pillar  Total  Scenario  Scenario  Scenario
NDC only  26  0  0  26  25  32  43
NDC + 3rd pillar  26  0  5  31  34  50  72
NDC + 2nd pillar  21  5  0  26  26  42  61
NDC + 2  nd+  3  pillars  21  5  5  31  35  60  90
36This table shows that more (less) favorable economic  and demographic  conditions
lead to higher (lower) replacement rates within a NDC-DC multi-pillar system.  A critical
assumption for second and third pillar calculations is the relationship between the interest
rate and wage growth.  The pessimistic scenario assumes that the real interest rate equals
real  wage  growth,  while  the  base  case  and  optimistic  scenarios  assume  that  the  real
interest rate  exceeds  real  wage  growth by 2% and 3%,  respectively.  Real  wage  growth
under the pessimistic, base case and optimistic scenarios is 2%,  3%, and 4% respectively,
and the real interest rate is 2%, 5%, and 7% respectively.
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The purpose of the paper is  to review the structure and performance of the Czech
pension  system and examine alternative  reform options. The paper shows that in
the absence of reform  the deficits of the Czech pension  system may  exceed 8
percent of GDP in 2050.  To contain these deficits the paper explore two  major
PAYG  reform options. The first major option is  a standard  parametric reform  that
preserves the defined  benefit (DB)  scheme. The second major option involves
parametric reforms  combined with a switch to a notional defined contribution
(NDC)  scheme. The paper shows that the NDC  cum parametric  reforms would
automatically tighten the link between contributions  and benefits and be more
resilient to unpredicted demographic  shocks  However, both the DB  and the NDC
options would produce a significant  reduction in replacement rates, especially for
young generations. To avoid an excessive drop  in replacement ratios the authorites
should make an effort to increase coverage of the third pillar and improve the
regulatory framework for third pillar funds. The authorities may also have to consider
introducing a second pillar to ensure  universal coverage, especially of young
workers.  Introducing a second pillar will be easier if the PAYG  reforms  start
immediately. This is  because an early implementation of the  PAYG reforms would
produce a significant improvement of the  PAYG and offset at least partly the  revenue
),losses arising from the diversion of contributions  to the second  pillar.
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